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Abstract
The role of embodied mechanisms in processing sentences endowed with a first person perspective is now widely
accepted. However, whether embodied sentence processing within a third person perspective would also have motor
behavioral significance remains unknown. Here, we developed a novel version of the Action-sentence Compatibility Effect
(ACE) in which participants were asked to perform a movement compatible or not with the direction embedded in a
sentence having a first person (Experiment 1: You gave a pizza to Louis) or third person perspective (Experiment 2: Lea gave
a pizza to Louis). Results indicate that shifting perspective from first to third person was sufficient to prevent motor
embodied mechanisms, abolishing the ACE. Critically, ACE was restored in Experiment 3 by adding a virtual ‘‘body’’ that
allowed participants to know ‘‘where’’ to put themselves in space when taking the third person perspective, thus
demonstrating that motor embodied processes are space-dependent. A fourth, control experiment, by dissociating motor
response from the transfer verb’s direction, supported the conclusion that perspective-taking may induce significant ACE
only when coupled with the adequate sentence-response mapping.
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Introduction
Increasing evidence supports the notion that embodied
processes take place while we are either merely observing actions
being made by others, or just hearing verbal descriptions of such
actions. In this context, neuroimaging findings have highlighted
the activity of the motor system during the processing of verbally
described actions in the absence of any performed or imagined
action [1,2,3]. The recruitment of the sensori-motor system during
language processing is thought to serve embodied understanding,
as it has been shown to impact the subject’s motor [4,5,6] and
perceptual behavior [7,8]. For instance, when deciding with a
backward or forward movement whether a sentence is meaningful
or meaningless Glenberg and Kaschak [9] reported faster
responses when the direction embedded in the sentence was
congruent with the response movement direction (e.g., ‘‘You gave
the pizza to Andy’’ & forward movement or ‘‘Andy gave you the
pizza’’ & backward movement). In this action-sentence compat-
ibility effect (ACE) participants are called into action directly: they
seem to read ‘‘You gave…’’ as ‘‘You moved away from your
body’’, thus acting from a strictly first-person perspective.
In everyday life, we often behave as agents or recipients of
actions, and both roles are intimately linked to the experience of
having a first-person perspective, a point of view on the world that
is only ours. We can take somebody else’s perspective, though and
we can experience actions from a third person perspective,
particularly through language. Pronouns and nouns may shift
perspective in a way that is very important for our social
interactions, as the more we are able to grasp different aspects
of actions and situations, the more we will be socially adapted. In a
straight-forward view of embodied cognition, transfer sentences
would automatically activate the correspondent transfer actions,
their effectors and possibly their kinematics. However, it has been
made clear that not only verbs, but other parts of sentences, like
pronouns and nouns, can affect motor behavior [10,11].
Despite the obvious relationships between embodied processing
and perspective-taking, the issue of linguistic perspective has rarely
been investigated in the field of embodied cognition, whilst some
linguistic studies have addressed this question [12]. As recently
stressed by Zwaan [13], perspective is a challenge for embodied
theories of language comprehension (pp. 20–21), since they need
to give account of perspective taking and at the same time are
questioned by the behavioral effects of perspective itself. Does any
point of view induce the same, automatic motor resonance or does
it depend on the situation that language contributes to describe? A
recent study on pronoun-induced perspective by Brunye ´ and
coworkers [14] found that an internal (i.e., embodied) perspective
is assumed when using the pronoun ‘‘You’’, but not ‘‘He’’,
affecting the comprehension of simple narratives.
Here we asked whether the embodied processing of action
sentences would produce detectable motor effects when partici-
pants are required to take someone else’s perspective. To this
purpose, we manipulated different features of perspective taking
and developed a novel version of the well established Action-
sentence Compatibility Effect (see also [15]) in which subjects are
no longer involved directly into action, but have to put themselves
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performance would be affected according to the possibility of
taking or not a first person perspective. In particular, we predicted
that only the assumption of a 1
st person perspective on action
would produce a significant ACE phenomenon, whereas the
assumption of an external, 3
rd person perspective, would not.
Experiment 1
In a first experiment, we aimed at validating the ACE in
French, as it is endowed with different dative constructions with
respect to English. As in the original experiment by Glenberg and
Kaschak [9], all the sentences used the pronoun YOU, both as the
agent or the recipient of actions, thus directly calling the
participants into action. Similarly to the classical ACE paradigms,
we required participants to evaluate whether sentences were
meaningful or meaningless by moving a joystick away or towards
their body.
Methods
Participants. Thirty-two students of Lyon University
participated in experiment 1 for which they gave their informed
consent. All were right-handed, native French speakers with
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naive as to the
purpose of the experiment. For this, as well as for the following
experiments, all participants gave their verbal informed consent to
participate in the study, which was approved by the review board
of the INSERM U864 (now U1028) ethics committee.
Stimuli. We modified the original set of stimuli of Glenberg
and Kaschak [9] by following the work by Borregine and Kaschak
in which imperative sentences were eliminated [15]. Stimuli
consisted of transfer sentences, implying the action of giving/
receiving something, either concrete or abstract. Sentences were
composed by a noun/personal pronoun to indicate agent/
recipient of action, a verb in the past tense and a noun to
indicate the object transferred. The final set of stimuli (see
Supporting Information, Appendix S1) in French comprised: 40
sentences in the form ‘‘You gave x to Louis’’ (‘‘Tu as donne ´xa `
Louis’’) divided into 20 abstract (‘‘Tu as donne ´ une chance a `
Louis’’, You gave a chance to Louis)) and 20 concrete sentences
(‘‘Tu as donne ´ un livre a ` Louis’’, You gave a book to Louis). The
pool of sentences was constituted by 40 additional sentences in the
form ‘‘Louis gave you x’’ (‘‘Louis t’a donne ´ x’’), similarly divided
into 20 abstract and 20 concrete sentences.
The set was completed by 40 non-sense sentences (abstract and
concrete) of the first form (‘‘Tu as lance un crocodile a ` Louis’’, You
throw a crocodile to Louis), and 40 non-sense sentences of the
second form. Stimuli were displayed on a computer screen and
were randomly repeated into 2 blocks, for a total of 320 trials.
Procedure. The experiment took place in a sound-attenuated
booth. Participants sat in front of a computer screen holding with
their right hand a joystick located in front of them. The distance
between the participant’s head and the screen was about 70 cm.
Each trial started by displaying a central fixation cross, then a
sentence was presented until the participant started moving the
joystick, with a response time limited to 4000 ms. Participants
were instructed to read the sentence and to move the joystick
(away or towards the body) to respond as to whether the sentence
made sense or not, as soon as they could. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of two possible conditions, starting with
a response away for YES and towards for NO, or the reverse, and
the order was reversed in the second block. The response was
recorded as soon as the joystick reached a predetermined extent of
linear displacement, thus measuring the response time (i.e., the
time between sentence onset and beginning of movement, ‘reading
time’ in [9]). The sentence disappeared once this response
threshold was passed.
Data analysis. Data on response times for correct trials were
analyzed for each participant. Times beyond 62,5 standard
deviations from average were trimmed for each condition
separately for each participant. Final movement direction (away,
toward the body) was checked for each trial, to verify the accuracy
of participants’ movements (i.e. that they did not start moving in a
direction and then changed). The mean error rate was of 7% and
errors were evenly distributed among the different conditions. As
errors analyses revealed no speed-accuracy tradeoff, we focused on
RTs.
We applied a repeated measures ANOVA to the mean RTs for
each subject in each condition with type of verb (abstract/
concrete), role in sentence (agent/recipient), and movement
direction (away/toward) as within-subject variables. The effect
size was also calculated for each significant variable (g
2).
Results
The data on response times (RTs) showed a main effect of verb
type, as subjects responded faster to concrete than abstract
sentences (F(1,31)=41.73, p,0.001, g
2=0.7). A main effect of
role in sentence was also present (F(1,31)=6.81, p,0.05, g
2=0.1):
when the participant (YOU in the sentences) was the agent it took
her longer to respond as compared to when she was the recipient.
Crucially, the interaction role x movement direction was
significant (F(1,31)=4.52, p,0.05, g
2=0.1), which means the
ACE was present. Newman-Keuls post hoc test confirmed that
participants in the role of agent answered faster with a compatible
movement (i.e., away from their body) than an incompatible
movement (i.e., toward their body; p,0.05; see Figure 1). In the
same line, participants produced faster toward response move-
ments when they were in the role of recipients than agents
(p,0.01; Figure 1). The interaction involving type of verb was not
significant, but for comparative purposes with other studies,
separate performances on abstract and concrete sentences are
illustrated in Appendix S4.
Discussion
This first experiment validated our French version of the ACE.
Movement directions compatible with the role in the sentence (i.e.,
away/agent & toward/recipient) resulted in shorter response
times, particularly in the agent condition (see Figure 1). The worst
performance was observed when participants took on the agent
role, but had to respond with an incompatible movement direction
toward their body, this condition yielding to a significant increase
in response times compared to both the agent-away and the
recipient-toward conditions. Overall, these results indicate that
participants behaved as if the pronoun ‘‘you’’ in the sentences was
referring to themselves, and thus took a first person perspective
while performing the task. It is worth noting that the presence of a
significant ACE with the use of a joystick constitutes a
methodological extension of previous studies, in which button-
press responses were used. Joystick responses involve an additional
component of object-manipulation (the joystick is always in the
hands of the participant) to the traditional away-towards the body
movements.
Besides extending the general principle of the ACE phenomena
to a language with dative structures differing from English, the
findings of Experiment 1 suggest that the ACE may be selectively
obtained for the agent role. Nevertheless, when assuming the
recipient role, participants were more likely to show facilitation for
movements directed toward them. This experiment leaves open
Embodied Linguistic Perspective and Space
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occur when participants are asked to take a third person’s
perspective. Experiment 2 and 3 were designed to directly assess
this question.
Experiment 2
In the second experiment, our purpose was to investigate
whether the ACE is strictly dependent or not upon taking a first-
person perspective. To this aim, we modified the sentences of
Experiment 1 by introducing the names of LOUIS and LEA as
actors of a dyadic transfer interaction, in the form ‘‘Louis gave x to
Le ´a’’. Participants were no longer called into action directly, but
they were asked to assume the perspective of one of the actors
(Louis for males, Le ´a for females) and perform the task as if they
were him/her.
Methods
Participants. Thirty-four students of Lyon University
participated in experiment 2. The same criteria as in Experiment 1
were followed.
Stimuli. The pronoun YOU was substituted by using two
external actors, Louis and Le ´a in the same set of sentences used in
experiment 1. The structure and number of stimuli were otherwise
identical (see Appendix S2 in the Supporting Information).
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1.
Here, participants were additionally asked to take one of the actors’
perspective (third person) and to read the sentences as if they were
one of the two actors, assigned depending on participants’ gender
(see Appendix S5 for a complete translation of the instructions). At
the end of the experimental session each participant filled a
questionnaire in order to self-evaluate her performance during the
perspective-taking and sensibility judgment tasks. A list of 16
statements was presented and each participant was required to
indicate her agreement on a 14 cm horizontal line, where the
extreme left indicated ‘‘I do not agree at all’’ and the extreme right
indicated ‘‘I completelyagree’’.Thefullquestionnaireisavailablein
the Supporting Information (see Appendix S3).
Data analysis. The mean error rate was 4%, errors without
any speed-accuracy tradeoff. Data on response times for correct
trials were thus analyzed for each participant as in experiment 1.
In addition, the mean values of agreement for each item of the
questionnaire were computed and then analyzed.
Results
As in Experiment 1, concrete verbs yielded to faster responses
than abstract verbs (F(1,33)=8.76, p,0.01, g
2=0.6). However,
the interaction role x movement (i.e., the ACE), was not significant
(F(1,33)=3.043, p=0.09). There was actually a non significant
trend to an opposite pattern with respect to the classical ACE (see
Appendix S4 for separate illustration of abstract and concrete
sentences results): responses for the recipient-away condition and
agent-toward condition tended to be faster (see Figure 2). As
indicated by the average response time, overall longer with respect
to the first experiment, and by the questionnaire results
participants correctly performed the perspective-taking task and
showed a good comprehension of the task itself.
To statistically compare experiments 1 and 2, we performed an
ANOVA with experiment (1, 2) as between-subject variable and
type of verb (abstract/concrete), role in sentence (agent/recipient),
and movement direction (away/toward) as within-subject vari-
ables. The analysis showed a significant main effect of experiment.
In support to the idea that the perspective taking task was correctly
performed, RTs were longer in experiment 2 than in experiment 1
(F(1,63)=229.3, p,0.01). As expected, the main effect of Verb
Type was also significant (F(1,63)=40, p,0.01, g
2=0.4), with
concrete sentences yielding to faster RTs than abstract ones.
Crucially, the interaction Experiment X Role X Movement was
also significant (F(1,63)=12.5, p,0.05, g
2=0.2). Post-hoc test
confirmed the significant ACE in experiment 1, specifically for the
Agent role (p,0.01), and its absence in experiment 2, for all
conditions alike (all ps.0.05).
Discussion
When sentences did not imply the participants to take a first
person perspective, as the transfer action occurred between two
external actors (Louis and Le ´a), the ACE was no longer observed,
despite using the very same set of sentences. In other words,
shifting the participant’s perspective, from a first to a third person,
was sufficient to prevent the action-sentence compatibility effect to
occur. As a corollary, in order to induce a, behaviorally effective
motor perspective it is not sufficient to ask participants to act ‘‘as
Figure 1. Mean Response Time values for the French version of the ACE paradigm, as revealed by Experiment 1. The arrows indicate
response movement direction. The green arrows correspond to the compatible conditions, agent-away and recipient-toward. The red arrows
correspond to the incompatible conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025036.g001
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does not exclude that sentences may cause a perceptual
embodiment. However, it is worth noting that in experiment 2
there is no automatic activation of transfer direction, as typically
involving a relationship between an agent and a recipient with
specific movements away or towards the body. We hypothesize
that the ACE did not occur because participants were unable to
put themselves ‘‘in action’’, to assume an effective motor
perspective about the sentences they were reading. We thus
performed a third experiment in which a spatial anchor was given
to position the avatars’ location and possibly render the motor
perspective taking more effective.
Experiment 3
The results of Experiment 2 suggest that the motor effects of
processing linguistic actions are constrained by the participant’s
perspective. Trying to act as if we were in another person’s shoes
does not recruit the same network we recruit when acting in a first
person perspective. However, one might argue that ‘‘embodied’’
processes might be prevented when one is supposed to assume the
perspective of a disembodied character, as it was the case for our
second experiment where the two characters were abstract and
lacked even the minimal feature of spatial location (see [16,17,18]).
We reasoned that adding a virtual ‘‘body’’, in the form of a simple
spatial anchor, will allow the participant to know ‘‘where’’ to put
herself in space when taking Le ´a’s perspective. Following this
rationale, in a third experiment we tested the hypothesis that
adding spatial information to the perspective-taking manipulation
would create the conditions for the ACE to be re-instated.
Methods
Participants. Thirty-four students of Lyon University
participated in experiment 3. The criteria were the same as in
experiment 1 and 2.
Stimuli. The same set of stimuli of experiment 2 was used. In
order to enable a spatial anchoring in the perspective taking, each
trial started with the presentation of the spatial position of Louis
and Le ´a for 500 ms before sentence onset (see Figure 3). The
names ‘‘Louis’’ and ‘‘Le ´a’’ were presented within two circles
located on the right or the left of the screen and the actors’ position
was totally task-irrelevant. Left and right positions were used in
order to maintain the two names orthogonal to the response
direction, as the sentences already were. For this reason, we
avoided the use of other positions (namely, on the upper and lower
part of the screen), which would have induced an additional
dimension with respect to the participant’s body and moving
hand, and thus a potential confound. Furthermore, we decided to
reproduce a spatial anchor that could map the linguistic structure
of French sentences, where the agent is typically on the left and the
recipient on the right. In this sense the spatial anchor could be
directly mapped onto the position of the two actors in the
sentence, thus producing congruent and incongruent positions that
could modulate the ACE if a perspective is effectively taken.
Stimuli were divided into four blocks of trials, which randomly
assigned one character (Louis or Le ´a) to a spatial position (left or
right) and one movement direction (away or toward) to a response
(sensible or not). The final design comprised 2 spatial positions
(left/right), 2 roles in sentence (agent/recipient), 2 verbs (abstract/
concrete), and 2 movement directions (away/toward).
Procedure. The procedure and questionnaire were the same
as in Experiment 2. In addition, participants were instructed to
look at the spatial positions of Louis/Le ´a, then to read the
sentence and perform the task as if they were one of the two actors
(exactly as in experiment 2).
Data analysis. The mean error rate was 5%: Again, due to
the absence of any speed-accuracy tradeoff, we focused on RTs.
Data on response times for correct trials were analyzed for each
participant as in experiment 1 and 2. We applied a repeated
measures ANOVA to the mean response times of the participants,
with spatial position (left/right), type of verb (abstract/concrete),
role in sentence (agent/recipient), and movement direction (away/
toward) as within-subject variables. The effect size was also
calculated for each significant variable (g
2). The mean values of
agreement for each item of the questionnaire were also computed
and analyzed as in Experiment 2. In addition, a paired t-test was
applied to compare the level of agreement across experiments 2
and 3.
Results
As in the first two experiments the analyses revealed shorter
response times for sentences endowed with a concrete verb with
respect to an abstract verb (F(1,33)=32.53, p,0.001, g
2=0.5,see
Appendix S4 for graphics representing abstract and concrete results
Figure 2. Mean Response Time values for the third person perspective version of the ACE paradigm, as revealed by Experiment 2.
Conventions as in Figure 1. Note the longer response time and the trend to an opposite pattern with respect to Experiment 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025036.g002
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significant effect (F(1,33)=3.63, p=0.06, g
2=0.1), right spatial
position tending to be associated with shorter response times.
Crucially, the interaction between spatial position, role and
movement direction was significant (F(1, 33)=4.97, p,0.05,
g
2=0.05). Newman-Keuls post-hoc test revealed a compatibility
effect in the case of right spatial position (see Figure 4). When
participants assumed the agent role, away responses were faster than
toward ones (p,0.01). This confirms the stronger compatibility effect
for agent compared to recipient role we found in the first experiment.
Fortheleftspatialposition(Figure4),whilethecompatibilityeffectfor
the agent role tended to be maintained without reaching significance,
the recipient condition showed a significant effect: away movements
were faster than toward ones (p,0.01).
Remarkably, participants’ response to the questionnaire sug-
gested they were not (consciously) influenced by the actor’s place-
holder. In particular, they did not show any explicit preference, or
strategy, for the left or right spatial position to perform the
perspective task (mean agreement for left and right 4.83 cm and
4.66 cm, respectively). Noteworthy, the agreement in the two
experiments did not differ for the crucial items regarding the
perspective taking task (see detailed results in Figure 5).
Discussion
In Experiment 3, while the sentence and the perspective taking
tasks were identical to Experiment 2, the ACE was observed again,
with a specific pattern dependent on the spatial position of the
participant’s avatar. On the one hand, when participants took on
the role of agent, the compatible response direction (i.e., away) was
generally executed faster than the incompatible one, this effect
being clear when the place-holder for the character’s position was
located on the right. On the other hand, when participants took on
the recipient role, the incompatible response direction (i.e., away)
was generally executed faster than the compatible one (inverse
Figure 3. Temporal sequence of the display used in Experiment 3, adding a place-holder for each actor.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025036.g003
Figure 4. Mean Response Time values for the spatialized version of the third person perspective of the ACE paradigm, as revealed
by Experiment 3, as a function of the left and right spatial position of the participant’s avatar location. Conventions as in Figure 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025036.g004
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depending on response timing), this effect reaching significance
only when the character’s place-holder was on the left. It is worth
noticing that we did not observe the compatibility between agent
and left position that we could expect on the basis of words order,
the subject/agent being the first word of the sentence. These
results suggest that participants’ behavior was influenced by two
different interacting biases. A first bias would be the tendency to
assume and embody the agent more than the recipient role.
Somewhat by definition, asking participants to perform move-
ments is somehow already asking them to behave as agents. The
second bias would consist in placing themselves on the right of a
scene. According to these two biases, the strongest action-sentence
compatibility effects occurred when participants took on the role of
agent on the right and the ACE was re-instantiated even from a
third person perspective. According to the same biases, the
strongest incompatibility effects (and inverse ACE) were observed
when participants had to assume the role of recipient on the left.
The bias to place ourselves as agents on the right of a scene is
reminiscent of the right-left bias of western cultures [19,20])
according to which we tend to attribute agency to actors located
on the left when we observe a scene (i.e., to those who place
themselves on the right of the scene).
Experiment 4
The results of experiment 3 suggest that a spatial anchor is
capable to restore the ACE under specific constraints and with a
pattern that is different for the left and right spatial positions.
While at first sight it might seem puzzling that participants could
embody a verbal transfer by performing movements perpendicular
to the avatars, this is precisely the pattern one would expect if the
place-holder were effective in enabling participants to embody the
assigned third-person perspective, and were thus reading the
sentence from a shifted, first-person perspective. To control for this
interpretation, we conducted a fourth experiment with exactly the
same stimuli and procedure of experiment 3, but using left-right,
instead of back and forth response movements. We reasoned that,
in such conditions, no consistent ACE should be observed because
the left-right response movement (from the effectively taken actor’s
perspective) is now incompatible with the direction of giving-
receiving implied by transfer sentences.
Methods
Participants. A total of forty-two subjects participated in
experiment 4. All were students of Lyon University enrolled
according to the same criteria as in experiments 1, 2 and 3. They
were constituted by two subgroups of eighteen and twenty-four
participants, who performed slightly different versions of the
experiment (see below).
Stimuli. A subgroup of 18 subjects performed the experiment
by using exactly the same set of stimuli and design of experiment 3.
Since, again, no interaction with verb type was found on a
preliminary analysis, an additional subgroup of 24 subjects
performed the experiment by using only the sub-set of stimuli
corresponding to the concrete verbs of experiment 3, which were
thus analyzed on a total of forty-two participants.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 3,
expect that participants were instructed to move the joystick to the
left or to the right.
Data analysis. The mean error rate was of 5%, and no
evidence of speed-accuracy tradeoff was present. Data on response
times for correct trials were thus analyzed for each participant as
in experiment 3. We first applied on the smaller group (N=18) a
repeated measures ANOVA to the mean response times of the
participants, with spatial position (left/right), type of verb
(abstract/concrete), role in sentence (agent/recipient), and
movement direction (left/right) as within-subject variables. The
Figure 5. Mean values of agreement in experiments 2 (third person perspective without spatial localization) and 3 (third person
perspective with spatial localization) for each item of the questionnaire. Even if the presence of place holder directly affected the response
to the behavioral task, the ratings of perspective taking agreement were not different across experiments 2 and 3. See in particular item 3 ‘‘ It seemed
difficult to me to perform movements as if I were Le ´a/Louis’’ (t=20.12, p=ns), item 4 ‘‘It was really easy for me to perform movements as if I were
Le ´a/Louis’’ (t=0.4, p=ns). item 7 ‘‘I felt immediately in Le ´a/Louis’ shoes’’ (t=21.2, p=ns), item 9 ‘‘I had difficulties in taking Le ´a/Louis’ perspective’’
(t=1.32, p=ns), item 11 ‘‘The point of view of Le ´a/Louis immediately became mine’’ (t=20.5, p=ns), item 2 ‘‘I have correctly understood my
perspective’’ (t=0.25, p=ns).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025036.g005
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2).
The mean values of agreement for each item of the questionnaire
were also computed and analyzed as in Experiment 3. Secondly,
the same ANOVA, except for verb type (only concrete) was run on
the overall sample (N=42). In addition, a paired t-test was applied
to compare the level of agreement across experiments 3 and 4.
Results
No significant main effect, either of Verb Type or Spatial
Position, was present.
The crucial interactionSpatial Position X Role X Movement was
far from significance (F(1,17)=0.06, p=0.81), thus showing no
specific ACE pattern depending on spatial position or movement
type. Re-analyzing the data from experiment 3 with the same
number of subjects (i.e., a smaller sample in which N=18) already
showed a trend to significance (p=0.1). To avoid any risk of a Type
II statistical error, we performed an ANOVA with spatial position
(left/right), role in sentence (agent/recipient), and movement
direction (away/toward) as within-subject variables by adding the
results of the larger subgroup (total N=42). This ANOVA revealed
thattheinteractiontesting theACE,namelySpatialPositionXRole
X Movement, was still very far from significance (F(1,41)=0.34,
p=0.57). Similar to experiment 3, the questionnaire data did not
show any explicit difference for the left and right spatial position of
the avatar (t=1.7, p=ns). Interestingly, the level of agreement for
the crucial items regarding perspective did not significantly differ in
experiment 4 as compared to experiment 3 (item 6 ‘‘It was easier to
take Le ´a/Louis’s perspective when he/she was on the left’’,
t=20.2, p=ns; item 17 ‘‘When Le ´a/Louis was right, it was easier
to take her/his perspective’’, t=1.7, p=ns) suggesting that
participants did not show any explicit preference for the left or
right spatial position of the avatar, regardless the compatibility of
this position with the required motor task.
Discussion
In the fourth experiment, the use of response movements
parallel to the avatars’ spatial position, but orthogonal to the
direction of transfer action when taking the avatar’s perspective,
failed to produce any significant ACE. The only, but critical
difference between experiment 3 and 4 was the direction of the
response movement. In experiment 3, the back and forth
movement was compatible with a transfer action experienced by
the participants, while in experiment 4 the left-right movement
direction was no longer compatible with a transfer action. The
partially restored ACE in the third, but not the fourth experiment,
clearly suggests that avatars’ spatial position may induce significant
motor effects only when coupled with the adequate sentence-
response mapping. The absence of effect in experiment 4
reinforces the idea that the ACE depends on bodily/spatial
constraints: the spatial mapping facilitates the third-person
perspective taking and has therefore to be accompanied by a
response direction compatible with the newly embodied perspec-
tive. Even if congruent with the avatar’s positions, the use of left-
right movements does not produce a significant motor effect,
precisely because it does not map the typical transfer action as
experienced when embodying someone else’s perspective.
General discussion
A wealth of data supports the embodied cognition theory,
according to which, the processing of verbs and sentences
describing actions recruits the motor system and, as such, may
impact our motor behavior. Up to now, the studies dealing with
sentences have always used pronouns directly calling the
participants into action, such as in ‘‘You kicked the ball’’. The
question we addressed through this series of experiments was if one
would still recruit her motor system (as seen from overt behavior)
to process a sentence in which she is no longer present as a first
person, but asked to take someone else’s perspective (Beth kicked
the ball). To this aim, we manipulated the paradigm known to
induce action-sentence compatibility effect (ACE), in which
participants are required to judge whether sentences describing a
(concrete or abstract) transfer from an agent to a recipient made
sense or not. Results from a series of four experiments provide
substantial novel insights on how the ACE can be manifest and
modulated by perspective taking. Overall, our findings suggest that
the Action-sentence Compatibility Effect is not automatic and
mandatory, being far more flexible of what it was supposed to be.
In the first experiment we extended the ACE to French transfer
sentences. In the second experiment, we manipulated perspective-
taking by introducing two external actors and asking participants
to perform the task ‘‘as if they were’’ one of them. In this case, the
ACE was not observed, demonstrating that an effective first-
person perspective is necessary to induce ACE phenomena,
whereas processing a sentence with a third person perspective does
not impact subject’s motor behavior. We argue that in this
experiment perspective-taking did not occur at a motor level
because participants were unable to shift their bodily position in
the space of action. Indeed, when we allowed participants to
position themselves in the space from which the action takes place
(Experiment 3), the ACE phenomena were observed again, though
partially. This finding clearly indicates that having a place in
space, a ‘‘body’’, is a necessary step to enable such motor
embodiment processes. This conclusion is supported by previous
studies [21] showing that compatibility approach-avoidance effects
depend on how people represent themselves in space. Finally, our
fourth experiment, highlighted the fact that motor embodiment
depends upon the possibility of acting ‘‘as if’’ in a first-person
perspective: having a spatial position for our bodily self is
necessary, but not sufficient, as the direction of our response
movement needs to be performed in reference to the self to reflect
an sentence embodiment.
To conclude, we suggest that the motor effects of language
processing are constrained by the perspective of a specific agent
with a specific body position in space. When the body of the
participant is the only reference available for movements, shifting
perspective is sufficient to preclude any detectable motor effect
using the ACE phenomenon. Adding a spatial anchor to
perspective taking makes the motor effects reappear (under
specific constraints), suggesting that spatially localizing ourselves
allows embodying somebody else’s perspective.
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